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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1976 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JAMES UGOH 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1883 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KAYODE KASSIM 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-1884 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ABEL OGUNFUNWA 
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_____________ 
 
No. 12-2585 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FELIX MORDI  
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania                                                              
(District Court Nos. 1-09-cr-00356-4, 
1-09-cr-00356-1, 1-09-cr-00356-3, 
1-09-cr-00356-2) 
District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 14, 2013 
 
Before: SMITH, FISHER, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 1, 2013 ) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
The United States of America brings this consolidated appeal challenging 
the District Court’s application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines when 
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determining the appropriate term of imprisonment for co-defendants James Ugoh, 
Kayode Kassim, Abel Ogunfunwa, and Feliz Mordi. Specifically, the United States 
argues the District Court erred by refusing to apply a two-level enhancement 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) and a separate two-level enhancement under 
U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3). For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the sentences 
imposed by the District Court and remand for resentencing. 
I. 
Ugoh, Kassim, Ogunfunwa, and Mordi were each participants in a 
Canadian-based money laundering scheme directed at American citizens. Between 
2004 and 2009, unknown Canadian mass marketing fraudsters distributed 
thousands of letters and counterfeit checks through the mail to addresses in the 
United States. Those letters falsely promised cash, prizes, fictitious loans, 
commissions, and other payments to their recipients. Based on such promises, the 
letters induced the recipients to send a portion of their “winnings,” representing 
taxes and other bogus fees, to the scammers via a MoneyGram money transfer 
service. The defendants, each of whom owned or operated one or more 
MoneyGram outlets, conspired to intercept and launder the fraudulently-induced 
transfers and to distribute the proceeds. 
On October 28, 2009, a grand jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
returned a single fifty-five count indictment against all four defendants. The 
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indictment charged the defendants with various counts of mail fraud in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1341, wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The indictment also charged the 
defendants with one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, and 
money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. All four of the defendants 
ultimately entered into plea agreements with the government, under which they 
agreed to plead guilty to two counts contained in the indictment: (1) the charge of 
conspiring to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering, and (2) a 
single mail fraud charge. 
After the defendants entered into their respective plea agreements, the 
United States Probation Office prepared pre-sentence reports for the District 
Court’s use during sentencing. Of sole relevance on appeal, the Probation Office 
included two separate two-level enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 for each of 
the four defendants. The first enhancement was based on § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), which 
provides a two-level increase if a defendant is convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 
1956. The second was the enhancement set forth in § 2S1.1(b)(3), which provides 
for an additional two-level increase if § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) applies and the offense 
involved “sophisticated laundering.”  
All four defendants objected to the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 
2S1.1(b)(2)(B) on the grounds that they had not been convicted of violating 18 
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U.S.C. § 1956. They likewise objected to the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 
2S1.1(b)(3) for sophisticated money laundering since § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) is a 
prerequisite for that provision. The United States countered that, under Application 
Note 6 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, a defendant is considered “convicted” of violating 18 
U.S.C. § 1956 for purposes of the enhancements not only if he is convicted of the 
actual statutory offense, but also if he is convicted of conspiring to violate the 
statute, as was the case for each of the defendants. The District Court rejected the 
United States’ argument and refused to apply both enhancements, citing what it 
perceived to be an internal conflict between the two paragraphs in Application 
Note 6 and the plain language of § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B). The United States filed a timely 
notice of appeal with respect to each of the four sentences. 
II. 
 We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines. United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 2012); see also 
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (exercising 
plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines).1 
III. 
 We turn first to the District Court’s refusal to apply the two-level 
enhancement contained in U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B). This Guideline provides that 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). 
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a two-level enhancement should be imposed “[i]f the defendant was convicted 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B). The defendants argue that 
this two-level enhancement should not apply here because they were not 
“convicted” of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956, but rather were merely convicted under 
18 U.S.C. § 371 of conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C § 1956. The government 
contends that, under Application Note 6 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, a conviction for 
conspiracy to commit the underlying offense is sufficient for purposes of applying 
the enhancement under § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B). 
 Under the law of this circuit, application notes to the Sentencing Guidelines 
are afforded “controlling weight” unless they violate the Constitution, a federal 
statute, or are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. United States v. 
Lianidis, 599 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Stinson v. United States, 508 
U.S. 36, 47 (1993)). The government cites to Application Note 6 as set out in the 
commentary to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3—the generally applicable guideline related to 
factors that determine a defendant’s range of punishment. This Note provides in 
pertinent part: 
A particular guideline (in the base offense level or in a specific 
offense characteristic) may expressly direct that a particular factor be 
applied only if the defendant was convicted of a particular statute. For 
example, in § 2S1.1 (Laundering of Monetary Instruments; Engaging 
in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Unlawful 
Activity), subsection (b)(2)(B) applies if the defendant “was convicted 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956”. . . . 
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Unless otherwise specified, an express direction to apply a 
particular factor only if the defendant was convicted of a particular 
statute includes the determination of the offense level where the 
defendant was convicted of conspiracy, attempt, solicitation, aiding or 
abetting, accessory after the fact, or misprision of felony in respect to 
that particular statute. For example, § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) (which is 
applicable only if the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956) 
would be applied in determining the offense level under § 2X3.1 
(Accessory After the Fact) in a case in which the defendant was 
convicted of accessory after the fact to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 
. . . . 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. App. Note. 6 (emphasis added). 
We find no ambiguity in the language of Application Note 6. Rather, as 
illuminated by the emphasized portion above, the Note plainly states that when an 
enhancement requires conviction of a certain statute, such requirement is satisfied 
“where the defendant was convicted of conspiracy” to violate “that particular 
statute.” Id. This is exactly the scenario presented in this case. The relevant 
guideline, § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), provides for a two level enhancement when a 
defendant is convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The defendants here pled 
guilty to, and were convicted of, conspiring to violate § 1956. Under these facts, 
the enhancement undoubtedly applies. 
The defendants contend that our plain reading of Application Note 6 stands 
in conflict with the text of U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), which requires the defendant 
be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Although § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), on its face, 
requires a conviction of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 before applying the two-level 
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enhancement, nothing in the text of that provision establishes what constitutes a 
“conviction,” nor does the text explicitly require a conviction of the substantive 
terms of the statute. By defining the parameters of the term “conviction” to include 
convictions for conspiracy to commit the identified statute, Application Note 6 
brings clarity where U.S.S.G § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) is otherwise silent. This point is 
most evident with respect to U.S.S.G § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B), since Application Note 6 
specifically uses its applicability to § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) as an illustrative example 
demonstrating its operation. 
It is of no significance that, for purposes of an entry of judgment, the 
defendants were technically convicted of conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371.  
Section 371 is the general federal conspiracy statute which makes it illegal to 
“conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
Count I of the indictment—which charges the defendants with conspiracy under 18 
U.S.C. § 371—explicitly references 18 U.S.C. § 1956 when setting out “laundering 
of monetary instruments” as one of the “offenses” that the defendants conspired to 
commit. See Indictment, Count I, ¶ 9. The defendants pled guilty to this count, and 
therefore, for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, are deemed to have been 
convicted of conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1956. 
As plainly demonstrated by the text of Application Note 6, the Sentencing 
Commission intended the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) 
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to apply where a defendant has been convicted of conspiracy to commit money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Ugoh, Kassim, Ogunfunwa, and 
Mordi were each so convicted, and thus the District Court erred by rejecting the 
United States’ request to apply § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B)’s two-level enhancement to their 
sentences. 
The District Court likewise erred by refusing to apply the two-level 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3). This guideline provides for an 
additional two level enhancement if § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) applies and the offense 
involved “sophisticated laundering.” In reviewing the transcript from the various 
sentencing hearings, it appears the District Court agreed with the United States’ 
argument that the defendants’ criminal activity involved “sophisticated 
laundering.” However, the District Court refused to apply the enhancement based 
on its preliminary determination that § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B)—which acts as a 
prerequisite to § 2S1.1(b)(3)—did not apply. As described above, this conclusion 
was incorrect, and accordingly the District Court’s rejection of the enhancement 
under § 2S1.1(b)(3) was in error.  
Importantly, we do not hold that the enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 
2S1.1(b)(3) necessarily applies to the facts of this case. Instead, we simply find the 
basis for the District Court’s rejection of the § 2S1.1(b)(3) enhancement was 
legally incorrect. Whether the offense for which the defendants were convicted 
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involved “sophisticated laundering” is a question we leave in the capable hands of 
the District Court for consideration and resolution on remand. 
IV. 
 For the reasons described above, we will vacate the sentences for all four of 
the defendants, and we will remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
